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I. INTRODUCTION
The inherent conflict between freer international trade and greater
protection of the environment has emerged during the last ten years as
one of the most intractable problems of international law.' While in-
creased trade presupposes a greater degree of natural resource exploi-
tation and augmented manufacturing capacity, increased environmental
protection conversely presupposes conservation of natural resources
and stricter controls on industrial pollution. Thus, the two goals appear
mutually exclusive and even contradictory; yet, a recent trade treaty has
attempted to synthesize these goals and neutralize their harmful effects
on each other.2
On August 12, 1992, the United States, Mexico, and Canada signed the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 3 These parties negoti-
ated the regional free trade pact to eliminate many of the tariffs re-
stricting free trade between the three member states that exist under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).4 The participants
created NAF[A as a response to the development of other regional
trading blocs around the world, such as the European Community and
Pacific Rim states.5
Nonetheless, because of the fear generated by the environmental and
labor communities within the United States that NAFrA would spur ex-
cessive environmental degradation and job loss, the United States gov-
ernment negotiated side agreements specifically addressing environmen-
tal and labor issues.6 The Clinton administration completed the side
agreements initiated by the Bush administration, and Congress passed
the NAFTA and side accords as a package deal, even though they are
considered separate parallel agreements.7
This Article focuses on the North American Agreement on Environ-
mental Cooperation (NAFrA Environmental Side Accord or Side Ac-
1. C. FORD RUNGE, FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT: BALANCING TRADE LIB-
ERALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS 3-4 (1994).
2. See North American Free Trade Agreement, December 17, 1992, U.S.-Canada-
Mexico, 32 I.LM. 289 (1993) & 32 I.LM. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFrAJ.
3. Id.
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct 30, 1946, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S.
187 [hereinafter GATT].
5. Richard L Holman, EC Moves Ahead on New Members, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22,
1993, at A8.
6. The environmental and labor communities were key constituencies to the Dem-
ocratic members of Congress who controlled both the House and the Senate. Ken
Jennings & Jeffery W. Steagall, Unions and NAFTA's Legislative Passage: Coqfronta-
tion and Cover, 21 LAB. STUD. J. 61, 63 (1996). As a result, NAFTA could have been
lost without the side agreements in place. Id. at 65-67.
7. Id. at 62.
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cord),8 emphasizing the framework it establishes for bringing a com-
plaint on environmental grounds.9 Consideration is then given to the
"workability" of the elaborate procedural process established by the
NAFTA Environmental Side Accord.'" Finally, the weaknesses of the
prescribed methodology for bringing a complaint are highlighted, and
several case studies noted."
II. BACKGROUND & NEGOTIATIONS
A. Movement Toward a NAFTA Environmental Side Accord
The 1992-93 NAFrA debate polarized the United States. From an
environmental perspective, much of the concern centered on Mexico
and its lax enforcement regime. 2 The Bush administration's arguments
that increased wealth in Mexico from NAFTA's implementation would
create more revenue to enforce existing environmental laws and clean
up the border region were not well presented and were largely ineffec-
tive.'3 On the other hand, the environmental community deftly pre-
sented its assertions with stark "worse-case scenarios;" and consequent-
ly, these assertions were quite persuasive:
The debate over the NAFrA alone raised a number of trade-related environmental
concerns, including: fears that expanded trade would result in pollution spillovers
into the United States from increased industrial activity in Mexico; lower U.S.
environmental standards and a loss of U.S. sovereignty as laws and regulations
were "harmonized" at compromise or baseline levels; limitations on the ability of
the United States to use trade measures in support of international environmental
agreements; and marketplace disadvantages for U.S. facilities competing against
plants located in "pollution haven" Mexico-resulting in job losses or downward
pressure on U.S. environmental standards. 4
In order to blunt this powerful, coordinated attack on NAFTA, the U.S.
government was forced to address the environmental issues, but Canada
8. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, September 9-14,
1993, U.S.-Canada-Mexico, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAFTA Environmental Side Ac-
cord].
9. See infra notes 12-25 and accompanying text
10. See infra notes 26-149 and accompanying text
11. See infra notes 150-89 and accompanying text. An in-depth analysis of the vari-
ous domestic laws of the member states is beyond the scope of this study.
12. RUNGE, supra note 1, at 53.
13. Jennings & Steagall, supra note 6, at 63.
14. DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 1-
2 (1994).
and Mexico registered opposition to reopening NAFrA for discussion.'5
In order to save NAFIA without reopening it, all three countries agreed
that a parallel treaty was the best alternative. 6 The fact that the U.S.
government continued to negotiate the NAFrA Environmental Side Ac-
cord is a testament to the effectiveness of the arguments presented by
the environmental movement to the American public as well as to mem-
bers of Congress.
B. Completion of Negotiations Between Mexico, Canada, and the
United States
In March, 1993, President Clinton fulfilled a campaign promise by re-
commencing negotiations on the NAFTA Environmental Side Accord.'7
The negotiations proved long and difficult because the United States
initially proposed strong measures."8 The United States-Canadian Free
Trade Agreement, the precursor to NAFrA, did not contain provisions
for trade sanctions, and, thus, Canada was indignant at the thought of
allowing them in the NAFTA Environmental Side Accord, even though
Canada realized that the proposed enforcement provisions were primarily
aimed at Mexico."
Mexico also opposed the possibility of sanctions, claiming these sanc-
tions would infringe upon sovereignty.2" Within the United States, con-
gressional Republicans were predictably against sanctions as well, while
congressional Democrats threatened to kill NAFTA if the sanction provi-
sions were not included.2' In order to save NAFTA, Mexico eventually
15. Michael J. Kelly, Environmental Implications of the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 3 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 361, 388-89 (1993).
16. Kenneth Berlin, The North American Free Trade Agreement and the Environ-
ment: A New Paradigm for Environmental Protection in North America, in NAFrTA
CRITIcAL BUSINESS AND LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1994).
During the negotiation of NAFrA, the impact of trade on the environment be-
came an issue of great importance for the first time ever in a trade negotiation. Ul-
timately, it forced the parties to NAFrA to reopen their negotiations after the signing
of NAFrA and negotiate a specific side agreement designed to alleviate negative im-
pacts of trade on the environment.
17. Kal Raustiala, The Political Implications of the Enforcement Provisions of the
NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: The CEC as a Model for Future Accords, 25
ENVrL. L. 31, 36-38 (1995).
18. Daniel B. McGraw, Jr., Trade Agreements, available in WESTLAW, C990 ALl-
ABA 193, 201 (May 4, 1995). Such strong measures include a completely independent
Secretariat and trade sanctions for failure to enforce environmental laws. Id.
19. Raustiala, supra note 17, at 37-38.
20. Id. at 38.
21. Id. The U.S. environmental lobby was not silent on this issue by any means.
Id. They continued to push hard for meaningful enforcement provisions, and by April,
1993, some of the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) had come to support
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accepted the limited sanctions regime that now exists in the NAFTA
Environmental Side Accord.' Canada, while having succeeded in keep-
ing the sanctioning power inert as applied to itself, agreed to allow do-
mestic Canadian courts to impose fines, rather than grant this power to a
supranational body.'
Consequently, by August 13, 1993, only one day to the year after Presi-
dent Bush signed the original NAFrA, a draft text for the Environmental
Side Accord emerged that was acceptable to all parties and became part
of the NAFTA package.24 It is the first document of its kind anywhere in
the world, and for that it should be given due recognition. The agreement
that emerged is, above all, a document intended to ensure the enforce-
ment of environmental laws.25
As we shall see, however, the chasm between the treaty's intended
goals and the achievement of those goals is an exceedingly wide one.
Whether NAFTA can bridge this chasm is a question that will determine
its future effectiveness. Nonetheless, that the Agreement was actually
negotiated and agreed upon is a significant milestone and represents
movement in the right direction.
III. TEXTUAL PROVISIONS & WEAKNESSES
A. Parts One and Two
The preamble to the NAFTA Environmental Side Accord contains
flourishing rhetoric acknowledging the importance of strong environmen-
tal laws and their enforcement, as well as the links between environmen-
tal goals and international trade.26 The objectives in Part One go on to
discuss the promotion of sustainable development and increased coop-
eration between the Parties, avoidance of new trade barriers, compliance
NAFTA in principle. Id. Capitalizing on this split, President Clinton obtained their
commitment to support passage of the NAFrA package if the proposed trinational
panel envisioned under the NAFrA Environmental Side Accord had the power to
arbitrate environmental disputes. Id. at 37. Mexico eventually caved in under this
pressure and that exerted by House Democrats. Id. at 38.
22. Id. at 38.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. NAFTA Environmental Side Accord, supra note 8, at 1482.
with environmental regulations, and promotion of pollution prevention
policies.27
Mandatory language begins to emerge in Part TwoY For instance,
Article 3 recognizes "the right of each Party to establish its own levels of
domestic environmental protection," but at the same time mandates that
"each Party shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high
levels of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to im-
prove those laws and regulations."' Although this is general language, it
arguably confronts the potential problem of downward mobility by at-
tempting to address the creation of pollution havens,' one of the prima-
ry fears of the American environmental community under NAFTA.
Article 4 reflects U.S. public access laws by requiring the publication
of environmental laws and regulations and encouraging advance publica-
tion of proposed measures together with public comment periods.' Arti-
cle 5 provides that the Parties shall "effectively" enforce their own, but
not each others', environmental laws, and ensures that "judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative enforcement proceedings" are available to pro-
vide remedies.' These articles are buttressed by procedural guarantees
of "fair, open and equitable" proceedings that comply with due process
of law in Article 7.' In addition, they are open to the public, safeguard
responsive pleadings, and should encourage uncomplicated proce-
dures.'
Article 6, however, ultimately has-a greater bearing on a private party's
ability to bring a case than any other article in Part Two.' It requires
that "[e]ach Party shall ensure that interested persons may request the
Party's competent authorities to investigate alleged violations of its envi-
ronmental laws and regulations and shall give such requests due consid-
eration in accordance with law."3 7 Of course, the application of the "due
consideration in accordance with law" clause may qualify the impact of
this provision, giving a broader group of interested persons standing
under one Party's law than they have under another's. The language in
the following section supports this assertion. It reads: "Each Party shall
27. Id. at 1483.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. RUNGE, supra note 1, at 54.
32. NAF1rA Environmental Side Accord, supra note 8, at 1483.
33. Id. at 1484.
34. Id. at 1484-85.
35. Id. at 1484.
36. See id.
37. Id.
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ensure that persons with a legally recognized interest under its law in a
particular matter have appropriate access to... proceedings....
Again, the remedies are qualified, but extensive. The third section of
Article 6 breaks them out individually:
Private access to remedies shall include rights, in accordance with the Party's
law, such as: (a) to sue another person under that Party's jurisdiction for dam-
ages; (b) to seek sanctions or remedies such as monetary penalties, emergency
closures or orders to mitigate the consequences of violations of its environmental
laws and regulations; (c) to request the competent authorities to take appropriate
action to enforce that Party's environmental laws and regulations in order to pro-
tect the environment or to avoid environmental harm; or (d) to seek injunctions
where a person suffers, or may suffer, loss, damage or injury as a result of con-
duct by another person under that Party's jurisdiction contrary to that Party's
environmental laws and regulations or from tortious conduct.'
This section raises two concerns. First, if any of these proposed reme-
dies does not exist under the relevant Party's domestic law, then they are
not available to private individuals because NAFTA prohibits a Party
from creating a law that would provide for a domestic right of action
against another NAFTA Party.0 Moreover, for example, only a Mexican
citizen can bring a private action under Mexican law against a Mexican
industry; likewise for Canadian and U.S. citizens. Thus, a Texas farmer's
crop decimated by acid rain traced to a Mexican industrial plant is reme-
diless under Article 6. Furthermore, subsection (c) is a bogus remedy be-
cause a "request" for "appropriate" enforcement action is potentially
meaningless in the heavily bureaucratic states that currently comprise
the NAFTA nations.
B. Part Three
Part Three of the NAFTA Environmental Side Accord gives private
groups the opportunity to ensure enforcement.41 Nonetheless, as one
author stated, the political realities cannot be extricated from the legal
process:
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 1494. Under Article 38, a private individual does not have a right of
action against another Party: "No Party may provide for a right of action under its
law against any other Party on the ground that another Party has acted in a manner
inconsistent with this Agreement." Id.
41. Id. at 1485-89.
[T]he parties retain the power to impose political limitations on the complaint
process. However, here the political controls are more subtle. The council and
secretariat are creatures of the three governments, which select the members of
the council and then, through the council, the executive director of the secretari-
at, who in turn appoints the staff of the Secretaiat Whether an NGO complaint
that did not have the support of a member government would be allowed into the
process is doubtful."
Structurally, Part Three begins by establishing the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (Comnmission) as the organ for implementing
the Side Accord. 3 The Side Accord divides the Commission into three
functional institutions: a Council, a Secretariat, and a Joint Public Advi-
sory Committee.'
1. The Institutions
Cabinet-level representatives of the Parties comprise the Council,
which meets annually unless a party specially requests an additional
meeting.45 Decisions are always made public and by consensus unless
otherwise agreed or provided in the Side Accord.' As the Council's
mandate is broader in scope than either of the other institutions,47 it
serves as the governing body of the Commission and essentially encour-
ages enforcement and compliance under the environmental laws and
regulations of the Parties.'
The Secretariat serves largely as the executive arm of the Commission
under the Council, establishing annual reports and budgets as well as
providing technical, administrative, and operational support,49 and tech-
nically remains free from the instructions of any Party's government.'
Although the Council envisioned the Secretariat to be the active suprana-
42. Jack I. Garvey, Trade Law and Quality of Life: Dispute Resolution under the
NAF]TA Side Accords on Labor and the Environment, 89 AM. J. INT'L L 439, 446
(1995).
43. NAFTA Environmental Side Accord, supra note 8, at 1485.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1484-85.
47. Id. at 1485-87. The mandate allows the Council to consider and develop non-
binding recommendations on a wide array of issues such as comparability of tech-
niques and methodologies for data gathering and analysis; pollution prevention; scien-
tific environmental research and technology development; transboundary environmental
issues; harmful exotic species; conservation of wild flora, fauna, and endangered spe-
cies; environmental compliance and enforcement approaches; and eco-labelling. Id. at
1485-86.
48. Id. at 1486.
49. Id. at 1487.
50. See id. (Article 11: Secretariat Structure and Procedures and Article 12: Annual
Report of the Commission).
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tional body of the Commission, the Council serves as a brake on the
Secretariat's activities; and thus, the national governments avoided relin-
quishing unfettered latitude on trade-environmental matters.
The Joint Public Advisory Committee is a partial tip of the hat to the
idea of public participation. Its mandate involves providing the Council
and Secretariat with advice on any matter within the scope of the
NAFTA Environmental Side Accord."' An equal number of members
from each Party selected by the Party or, at the Party's option, by its
National Advisory Committee comprises the Joint Public Advisory Com-
mittee.' Members of the public and Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) comprise the National Advisory Committee, but the Side Accord
does not require the Parties to bring these committees into existence.'
Consequently, it is possible for Canada's representatives to be environ-
mental engineers and professors, America's representatives members of
environmental NGOs and public citizens, and Mexico's representatives
members of industrial associations and trade specialists.
2. The Petition Process
Article 14 contains the key provisions of the NAFTA Environmental
Side Accord that allow for direct citizen involvement in the enforcement
process. This article has a promising introductory tone, which proves
upon analysis to be potentially fleeting. It begins:
The Secretariat may consider a submission from any non-governmental organiza-
tion or person asserting that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its environ-
mental law, if the Secretariat finds that the submission:
(a) is in writing in a language designated by that Party in a notification to the
Secretariat;
(b) clearly identifies the person or organization making the submission;
(c) provides sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to review the sub-
mission, including any documentary evidence on which the submission may be
based;
(d) appears to be aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at harassing in-
dustry;
(e) indicates that the matter has been communicated in writing to the relevant
authorities of the Party and indicates the Party's response, if any; and
51. Id. at 1489.
52. Id.
53. Id.
(f) is filed by a person or organization residing or established in the territory
of a Party.'
Note the extensive discretionary authority given the Secretariat. First,
the Secretariat has the option simply to not consider a submission with-
out even justifying its decision.' Second, if the Secretariat does decide
to consider a submission, it may do so only if the submission successful-
ly jumps the hurdles laid out in subsections (a) through (f) of Article
14.' Third, the procedural hurdles are riddled with discretionary find-
ings such as the "clearness" of the submitter's identification, the "suffi-
ciency" of the information, the "appearance" of harassment, and the
"indicativeness" of communication to the relevant Party.5" A valid sub-
stantive submission could easily fail on any of these procedural grounds.
Moreover, NAFrA limits submissions by an NGO or person to the
territories in which they are located.' For instance, an Arizona environ-
mental group cannot submit against Mexico for allowing raw sewage to
drain into the Rio Grande, only a Montana citizens' coalition can submit
against the United States Department of the Interior for allowing over-
grazing on the badlands, and only Quebec fishermen can submit against
the Federal Environmental Ministry for allowing toxic discharge into
fishing waters in the Gulf of Maine. The practical effect, therefore, pre-
cludes transboundary pollution submissions.
If the submission is lucky enough to pass the initial battery of hurdles,
it then proceeds to the next section wherein the Secretariat must deter-
mine whether the submission merits requesting a response from the
Party. Here, the submission encounters another obstacle course of guide-
lines which the Secretariat "shall" consider in making its determination:
In deciding whether to request a response, the Secretariat shall be guided by
whether. (a) the submission alleges harm to the person or organization making
the submission; (b) the submission, alone or in combination with other submis-
sions, raises matters whose further study in this process would advance the goals
of this Agreement; (c) private remedies available under the Party's law have been
pursued; and (d) the submission is drawn exclusively from mass media reports.'"
Should the Secretariat decide, again at its discretion, to request a re-
sponse, it then forwards the submission to the Party.' Within thirty
days, or sixty if notification occurs, the Party advises the Secretariat on
whether the matter is the subject of pending litigation (in which case the
submission dies) and any other matter it wishes the Secretariat to
54. Id. at 1488.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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know." Article 15 then comes into play, and eventually, the Secretariat
decides whether the submission warrants the development of a "factual
record," although the Side Accord imposes no time limit. 2 The Secretar-
iat must then secure the permission of the Council to proceed by a two-
thirds vote.'
After securing the Council's permission, the Secretariat develops a
draft factual record, considering any information furnished to it by a
Party, but maintaining the option of refusing to consider information
furnished by NGOs, persons, a Joint Public Advisory Committee, or ex-
perts.6' Upon completion of the draft factual record, the Secretariat sub-
mits it to the Council, then accepts comments from any Party (but no
one else), makes appropriate revisions, and submits a final factual record
to the Council. 5 The Council may then decide, at its discretion and by a
two-thirds vote, whether to make the final factual record publicly avail-
able.6
Of course, making "the final factual record publicly available" does not
require the Council to actually publish the factual record, only to make it
available. The Council's discretion means that, in practice, an interested
NGO would have to find and publish the factual record at its own ex-
pense in order to generate the public pressure necessary to force a Party
to enforce its environmental laws and regulations. Otherwise, the "public-
ly available" documentary finding would simply languish in a bureaucrat-
ic office. Even to contemplate publicizing the factual record, an NGO
must hope that the Council decides to exercise its discretion and make
the finding publicly available. This falls short of even "declaratory relief"
usually granted by common law courts.
Beyond these obviously inadequate procedures, the petition process
goes no further.67 Articles 14 and 15 only provide for redress by a pri-
61. Id.
62. id.
63. Id. at 1488-89.
64. Id.
65, Id.
66. Id.
67. "Critics have questioned the CEC's effectiveness under Articles 14 and 15 to re-
verse government actions that could negatively impact the region's environment."
NAFTA: Commission to Decide on Petition Alleging U.S. Cuts in ESA Funding Vio-
late Side Pact, 1995 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 155, at D-9 (August 11, 1995) [here-
inafter Commission to Decide]. "CEC representatives respond that most of the
trinational organizations' success will lie on behind-the-scenes pressures to each gov-
ernment" Id.
vate party against its own country for failure to enforce its environmen-
tal laws. If a private party wants to challenge another country on similar
grounds, it has two options. The first option is to persuade an NGO from
the other country to bring the action and then join in as one of several
submitters.' The second option is for the private party to persuade its
own country to begin the dispute resolution process provided for in Part
Five of the NAFTA Environmental Side Accord.
C. Part Five
The Side Accord handles disputes differently between NAFTA Parties
than the private party petition process. Part Five establishes the proce-
dures for dispute resolution between the Parties, which can ultimately
result in an arbitration.'
1. Disputes Between Parties
Arguendo, should an NGO be successful in persuading its government
to bringing a case against another NAFrA Party, the procedure for bring-
ing the suit begins with Article 22. Interestingly, this provision substan-
tially increases the threshold requirement for beginning the process. The
Party bringing the suit must allege that "there has been a persistent pat-
tern of failure by that other Party to effectively enforce its environmen-
tal laws.""
This "persistent pattern" standard is much more difficult to meet than
the nonenforcement standard established under the private party petition
process. The underlying rationale for raising the standard rests on the
premise that not all countries are at similar stages of developing environ-
mental law, nor do they possess sufficient resources to ensure the effec-
tive enforcement of stringent environmental legal regimes.7 Because the
arbitration process can potentially yield monetary penalties or trade
sanctions, the Side Accord substantially increased the threshold require-
ment to begin this process.
68. This was done for the Endangered Species Act submission in 1995. Cheryl
Hogue, NAFTA: Commission Will Not Investigate Claim that U.S. Failing to Enforce
ESA, 1995 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 187, at D-15 (Sept. 27, 1995). "Five environ-
mental groups in the United States and Mexico on July 5 asked the Commission on
Environmental Cooperation (CEC) ... to investigate their claims .... Filing the
petition for the investigation were the Biodiversity Legal Foundation, Consejo Asesor
Sierra Madre, Forest Guardians, Greater Gila Biodiversity Project, and the Southwest
Center for Biological Diversity." Id.
69. NAFrA Environmental Side Accord, supra note 8, at 1490-94.
70. Id. at 1490 (emphasis added).
71. Kenneth Berlin & Jeffrey M. Lang, Trade and the Environment, 16 WASH. Q.
35, 46 (1993).
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The process begins when the alleging Party submits written requests
for consultations to the offending Party and the Secretariat.' If consul-
tations do not resolve the matter within sixty days,73 a special session of
the Council may be requested. The Council can, at its discretion, convene
and discuss the matter.74 If it does convene, the Council may study the
matter, use mediation or conciliation, or make recommendations to re-
solve the dispute, which may be made public if the Council so decides by
a two-thirds vote.75 Article 23 states: "Where the Council decides that a
matter is more properly covered by another agreement or arrangement to
which the consulting Parties are party, it shall refer the matter to those
Parties for appropriate action in accordance with such other agreement
or arrangement."76
The text of this conditional mandate suggests that if a separate inter-
national agreement exists between the two disputing parties concerning
the environmental matters at issue, their proper recourse is through the
mechanics of that agreement rather than through the NAFTA Environ-
mental Side Accord. This interpretation is buttressed by Article 40, which
states that "[niothing in this Agreement shall be construed to affect the
existing rights and obligations of the Parties under other international
environmental agreements, including conservation agreements, to which
the Parties are party."77
Consequently, if a dispute arises concerning anadromous fishing stocks
in the Gulf of Maine between Canada and the United States, and the
United States has ratified the Law of the Sea Convention,' that treaty
would govern resolution of the dispute. Article 40 arguably also broadens
the scope of NAFTA's Article 104. Under the Article, the Parties agreed
that in the event of an inconsistency between NAFTA and the Conven-
tion on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora,' the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
72. NAFTA Environmental Side Accord, supra note 8, at 1490.
73. Id. at 1490. Note that the time period for consultations may be other than 60
days if the consulting Parties agree. Id.
74. Id. If it decides to convene, the Council must do so within 20 days. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1494.
78. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 LLM.
1261. UNCLOS 1H has extensive environmental provisions. Anadromous stocks are
governed by Article 66. Id. at 1282.
79. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, March 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
Layer,' or the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal,' those environ-
mental agreements would prevail, provided that the Parties use the least
trade-restrictive alternative to resolve the inconsistency.'
2. The Arbitration Process
Ultimately, if the dispute cannot be settled by any other means, it can
go to arbitration. Although the arbitration process is usually binding by
all Parties to the agreement, it is in reality "more akin to a declaratory
judgment procedure than arbitration."' Under Article 24, if the Council
cannot resolve the situation within sixty days, a Party may request for-
mation of an arbitration panel.8' The Council must convene the panel if
the Party's request receives a two-thirds vote of the Council.'
Another procedural hurdle arises at this point. The panel will only be
convened when a complained-against Party's alleged consistent failure to
"effectively enforce its environmental law relates to a situation involving
workplaces, firms, companies or sectors that produce goods or provide
services: (a) traded between the territories of the Parties; or (b) that
compete."'M If the Party does not surmount this hurdle, the process goes
no further. It is, in effect, an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. This
provision ostensibly ensures that the dispute links a Party's environmen-
tal concerns to only trade issues.
Article 25 establishes the roster of potential panelists from which the
Council may draw the arbitral panel.8 7 The roster is comprised of people
who "have expertise or experience in environmental law or its enforce-
ment, or in the resolution of disputes arising under international agree-
80. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, done on Sept.
16, 1987, 26 IL.M. 1541.
81. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal, done on Mar. 22, 1989, 28 IL.M. 649.
82. NAFrA, supra note 2, at 297-98.
83. Garvey, supra note 42, at 446. The arbitration process resembles a declaratory
judgment procedure on several fronts. The most notable aspect is that "[tihe arbitra-
tion panel's report is only declarative on the .merits of the issue," and does not pro-
duce a conclusive determination on all issues of the dispute. Id. The parties are ex-
pected to take the panel's report and begin mediation or negotiation sessions for the
purpose of finalizing an action plan to resolve the issues in the dispute based upon
the panel's findings. Id.; see NAFTA Environmental Side Accord, supra note 8, at
1492.
84. NAFrA Environmental Side Accord, supra note 8, at 1492.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1491. The Council, via a consensus selection process, is responsible for
creating and maintaining a roster of 45 people to be panelists, each with a term of
service of three years. Id.
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ments, or other relevant scientific, technical or professional expertise or
experience."' The panel selection process under Article 27 is rather
convoluted, and is somewhat similar to the jury selection process in
common law jurisdictions.
The panel consists of five members, and the chair is the first member
selected.' Within fifteen days of the Council's vote to convene the pan-
el, the Parties must agree on the chair.' If that is not possible, then one
of the disputing Parties is chosen by lot to select the chair, but the chair
selected cannot be a citizen of that Party.9 Within fifteen to thirty days
of chair selection, each Party chooses two panelists who are citizens of
the other disputing Party. 2 However, the panelists are not required to
be members of the roster, Article 27 provides only that "[planelists shall
normally be selected from the roster."' If any other Party objects to the
proposal of a non-roster panelist, it may exercise a peremptory challenge
to veto the proposed panelist. 4
Under this selection process, a panel hearing a United States-Mexico
dispute in which the United States is the complaining Party could con-
ceivably consist of an American industrial processing expert, an Ameri-
can international mediation attorney, a Mexican environmental lawyer, a
Mexican ecosystem biologist, and a Swiss chairperson who is an interna-
tional trade negotiator. Alternatively, the panel could be made up of an
American chemistry professor, an American corporate environmental
counsel, a Mexican law professor, a Mexican international trade special-
ist, and a Japanese chairperson who is an environmental engineer. In
short, the possible combinations are as varied as a Rubic's Cube.
Unless the "Parties otherwise agree within 20 days after the Council's
vote to convene the panel," the panel's default standard of review is the
following:
To examine, in light of the relevant provisions of the Agreement, including those
contained in Part Five, whether there has been a persistent pattern of failure by
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. There is no NAFrA equivalent of a Batson challenge for these peremptory
challenges; because the court based Batson on racial discrimination not allowed un-
der the U.S. Constitution, these considerations do not have extraterritorial application.
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding State's use of peremptory chal-
lenges subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause).
the Party complained against to effectively enforce its environmental law, and to
make findings, determinations and recommendations in accordance with Article
31(2).1)6
The arbitral panel may seek any "information and technical advice
from any person or body that it deems appropriate," subject to the agree-
ment of the Parties.' One hundred eighty days after the panel has been
selected, the panel must issue an initial report which contains findings of
fact, a determination of whether a persistent pattern of failure to enforce
environmental laws has occurred, and if so, the panel's recommendations
for the resolution of the dispute, "which normally shall be that the Party
complained against adopt and implement an action plan sufficient to
remedy the pattern of non-enforcement."97
Any disputing Party has thirty days to submit written comments on the
initial report, which may persuade the panel to reconsider its report and
make further examinations.98 The panel presents its final report to the
Parties within sixty days after the initial report, and the Parties then
forward the final report to the Council within fifteen days of receipt.'
The Council has an affirmative duty to "publish" the final report within
the subsequent five days."6
3. Available Remedies
If the panel determines that a "persistent pattern of failure" to enforce
environmental laws exists, the Parties have the option of agreeing "on a
mutually satisfactory action plan" to address the problem, "which nor-
mally shall conform with the determinations and recommendations of the
panel."'' Under Article 34(1)(a) and Article 34(2), if the Parties cannot
reach agreement on an action plan, a Party may request that the panel
reconvene between sixty and one hundred twenty days from the issuance
of the final report. °2 When the panel reconvenes, it first decides wheth-
er the "action plan proposed by the Party complained against is sufficient
to remedy the pattern of non-enforcement. " "°
The panel approves the action plan if it deems it sufficient and then
the Secretariat approves it. " If the panel does not consider it suffi-
95. NAFrA Environmental Side Accord, supra note 8, at 1491-92.
96. Id. at 1492.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1493.
104. Id.
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cient, however, the Secretariat establishes an action plan "consistent
with the law of the Party complained against."' The Secretariat also
has the option of imposing a monetary enforcement assessment under
Annex 34"° within ninety days after the panel reconvened. 7 The
imposition of such a penalty, however, is not mandatory."°
Under Article 34(l)(b) and Article 34(3), if the Parties are unable to
agree on whether an action plan is being properly implemented, either
Party may reconvene the panel after 180 days from the establishment of
the action plan."° The panel must then determine whether the action
plan is being fully implemented."' If it is, then that is the end of the
matter."' If it is not being fully implemented, however, "the panel im-
poses a monetary enforcement assessment in accordance with Annex
34 .... [w]ithin 60 days after it has been reconvened.""' The Annex
then mandates that the panel must "provide that the Party complained
against shall fully implement" the action plan, "shall pay any monetary
enforcement assessment," and that the panel's provision "shall be fi-
nal.""' 3 This part is not optional, but rather a form of mandatory sen-
tencing."1
4
If a Party fails to comply with the order to pay a monetary enforce-
ment assessment, then NAFIA benefits may be suspended unilaterally by
the complaining Party against the offending Party under Article 36 and
Annex 36... in an amount no greater than that equal to the original
monetary enforcement assessment."'
105. Id. Note that the language here is normative: "shall establish." Id.
106. See infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the imposi-
tion of a monetary enforcement assessment under Annex 34.
107. NAFrA Environmental Side Accord, supra note 8, at 1493. Note that the lan-
guage here is precatory: "may." Id.
108. Id,
109. Id. at 1492-93.
110. Id at 1493.
111. Id.
112. Id. Note that here the language is normative, "shall impose a monetary en-
forcement assessment," as opposed to the earlier precatory language used for a pen-
alty imposition. Id.
113. Id. After 180 days from the panel's determination that a Party is not fully im-
plementing its action plan, the complaining Party may request that the panel recon-
vene to make a similar determination. Id. This acts as a follow-up mechanism to
ensure implementation proceeds. Id.
114. Id.
115. See infra notes 135-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of Annex 36.
116. NAFrA Environmental Side Accord, supra note 8, at 1493. Several escape
When the complaining Party suspends benefits, the panel reconvenes
to determine whether the Party paid the equivalent of the monetary en-
forcement assessment or whether it fully implemented the action
plan. " 7 If the Party fully implements the action plan, it is no longer sub-
ject to NAFTA benefit suspension." 8 The offending Party may also have
its penalty reduced if it believes that the suspension of benefits is "main-
festly excessive.""9 In these cases, the panel reconvenes at the request
of the Party complained against and makes its determination within for-
ty-five days.
20
Remedies not specifically available, as noted earlier, are enforcement
by one Party's authorities of environmental laws in the territory of anoth-
er Party, 2' and a right of action under the domestic law of one Party to
reach another Party "on the ground that another Party has acted in a
manner inconsistent with this Agreement."'" Consequently, Articles 33
through 36 provide the remedies available to the complaining Party."2
D. The Annexes
The operation of the Annexes to the NAFrA Environmental Side Ac-
cord directly affect the imposition of the above-mentioned remedies,
their effectiveness, and their procedural application. 24 Annex 34 pro-
vides that no monetary enforcement assessment shall be "greater than
.007 percent of [the] total trade in goods [not including services] between
the Parties during the most recent year for which data are available."'25
In essence, this is a fluctuating cap on the maximum penalty that can be
imposed by an arbitral panel. 26
Annex 34 also lays out a guideline type of formula for determining the
amount of a monetary enforcement assessment which the arbitral panel
is required to consider
hatches have been built into this Article, however, to allow the offending Party to get
out from under the trade benefit suspension either completely or partly. Id.
117. Id. The panel makes its determination within 45 days. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1494. "Manifestly excessive" will likely be construed to mean that the
suspension of benefits is greater than the monetary enforcement assessment issued by
the panel.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1492-93. See supra notes 102-20 and accompanying text (discussing Arti-
cles 34 and 36).
124. See NAFrA Environmental Side Accord, supra note 8, at 1495. "The Annexes
to this agreement constitute an integral part of the agreement." Id. at 1492-93.
125. Id. at 1496.
126. See id.
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In determining the amount of the assessment, the panel shall take into account:
(a) the pervasiveness- and duration of the Party's persistent pattern of failure to
effectively enforce its environmental law; (b) the level of enforcement that could
reasonably be expected of a Party given its resource constraints; (c) the reasons,
if any, provided by the Party for not fully implementing an action plan; (d) efforts
made by the Party to begin remedying the pattern of non-enforcement after the
final report of the panel; and (e) any other relevant factors."
The factors to be taken into account could be characterized as mitigat-
ing factors akin to those that a U.S. criminal court takes into consider-
ation when determining a guilty defendant's sentence. I" For instance,
(b) plays to Mexico's favor." Mexico's resources are limited and un-
derstandably prioritized such that environmental enforcement ranks rela-
tively low compared to economic development policies and infrastructure
construction. While (c) and (d) potentially play to each Party's favor, (a)
could cut into any Party's arguments equally because it is determined
from the final report."3 Of course, (e) is an avenue for the arbitral pan-
el to justify any monetary enforcement assessment that it establishes. 3'
All collected monetary enforcement assessments go into a fund con-
trolled by the Council and are spent to improve the environment or en-
hance environmental law enforcement in the territory of the Party com-
plained against." Thus, in a very real sense, the money never leaves
the country. It is put back into the offending nation and spent for envi-
ronmental purposes." In this way, the Commission could be accused
of reprioritizing that nation's expenditure on domestic programs, thereby
interfering with that nation's free exercise of sovereignty."u
Annex 36B lays out the regime for collection of the monetary enforce-
ment assessment through suspension of NAFTA benefits when the of-
fending Party will not pay the assessment:
Where a complaining Party suspends NAFFA tariff benefits in accordance with
this Agreement, the Party may increase the rates of duty on originating goods of
the Party complained against to levels not to exceed the lesser of: (a) the rate that
was applicable to those goods immediately prior to the date of entry into force of
the NAFrA, and (b) the Most-Favored-Nation rate applicable to those goods on
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Id. Note that the expenditure must be consistent with the law of the Party
complained against. Id.
133. Id.
134. See id.
the date the Party suspends such benefits, and such increase may be applied only
for such time as is necessary to collect, through such increase, the monetary en-
forcement assessment. 1
It should be noted that the collection in increased tariffs accrue to the
benefit of the complaining Party." The monies collected under this An-
nex are not handed over to the Council's fund for redistribution into the
offending country for environmental purposes.' The monies remain
with the complaining Party." Thus, it is in the offending Party's best
interest to pay the original monetary enforcement assessment to ensure
that the money comes back into the country."
Annex 36B does contain the caveat that the complaining Party "shall
first seek to suspend benefits in the same sector or sectors as that in
respect 'of which there has been a persistent pattern of failure by the
Party complained against to effectively enforce its environmental
law." '4 The provision that if the complaining Party considers it im-
practicable or ineffective to suspend benefits in the same sector it may
suspend benefits in other sectors, however, undermines this caveat. 4 '
Annex 36A is a special one, pertaining only to Canada."" Under this
Annex, any panel determination that Canada must pay a monetary en-
forcement assessment or that it has failed to fully implement an action
plan, must be filed by the Commission in a Canadian court within 180
days of the determination."4 When filed, the determination becomes an
order of the court, and a subsequent court order to enforce the panel de-
termination is not subject to review or appeal.'"
Annex 41 contains many provisions also pertaining only to Canada.
45
The most important underlying principle, however, is that each Canadian
province must separately succeed to the NArFTA Environmental Side
Accord. 4 ' The Annex requires each province to sign the Canadian Inter-
governmental Agreement. 47 Canadian Environment Minister, Sheila
Copps, explained that "[iln Canada, the provinces have jurisdiction in
environmental matters, requiring the federal government to negotiate
135. Id. at 1496-97.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1497-98.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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with each province on most environmental issues that don't involve fed-
eral lands."'48 Alberta has already stepped forward and signed the
agreement.4 9
IV. CASE STUDIES & APPLICATIONS
To date, there have been no arbitrations between Parties. There have
been, however, three petitions brought under Articles 14 and 152' The
first two, brought mainly by American environmental groups, failed to
surmount initial procedural hurdles. 5' The third, brought exclusively by
Mexican NGOs, has cleared the Article 14 inquiries and triggered an in-
vestigation by the Secretariat. 2 The results of that investigation have
yet to be determined. A short summary of the three cases follows, in-
cluding a brief analysis of their respective arguments and the
Secretariat's legal reasoning.
A. The Endangered Species Act (ESA)'" Case
The ESA case was the first petition to be filed with the Secretariat
under the procedures set forth in Articles 14 and 15."M On July 5, 1995,
Earthlaw, an NGO at the University of Denver College of Law, filed a
submission on behalf of five environmental groups in the United States
and Mexico. 5' It asserted that an unrelated provision attached to a mili-
148. NAFTA: Alberta Becomes First Canadian Province to Sign Environmental
Cooperation Accord, 25 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 162, at D-13 (Aug. 22, 1995).
The Canadian Intergovernmental Agreement enables signatory provinces and
territories to fully participate in the implementation, management, and further
elaboration of the [NAFrA Environmental Side Accord], including cooperative
consultations, evaluations, and dispute resolution. In addition, signatories will
be able to initiate discussions and consultations on enforcement practices in
Mexico and the United States .... However, the provisions of the [NAFrA
Environmental Side Accord] do not come into effect until provinces with a
combined gross domestic product of 55 percent sign onto the Canadian In-
tergovernmental Agreement
Id.
149. Id. Canada consists of 10 provinces and 2 territories.
150. See infra notes 154-89.
151. See infra notes 154-79.
152. See infra notes 180-89.
153. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
154. Commission to Decide, supra note 67, at D-9.
155. Jay Tutchton, The Citizen Petition Process Under NAFTA's Environmental Side
Agreement: It's Easy to Use, but Does it Work?, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
tary appropriations bill by Senator Hutchison (R-Texas) included "a pro-
vision that suspended listings of threatened and endangered species and
designations of critical habitat under the ESA."'" This provision is re-
ferred to as the ESA Moratorium.
57
The NGO's submission alleged that the ESA Moratorium was a failure
by the United States to enforce its environmental law.'" Their underly-
ing rationale for this argument rested on a narrow reading of Article 3,
which recognizes "the right of each Party to establish its own levels of
domestic environmental protection and environmental development poli-
cies and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental
laws and regulations."'" Relying on Arizona case law, holding that the
ESA Moratorium did not constitute an amendment of the statute, the
NGOs asserted that "the United States had not modified or amended the
ESA through the ESA Moratorium; rather Congress had simply suspend-
ed the Act's enforcement."" °
In an opinion letter dated September 25, 1995, the Secretariat did not
agree with this characterization.' 6 ' After concluding that the submission
met all of the initial procedural hurdles laid out in Article 14(1), the Sec-
retariat moved on to Article 14(2) considerations to determine if the
submission warranted the requested response from the United States.'62
It was decided that the submission failed on this issue, and a response
was not requested:
The enactment of legislation which specifically alters the operation of pre-existing
environmental law in essence becomes part of the greater body of environmental
laws and statutes on the books. This is true even if pre-existing law is not amend-
ed or rescinded and the new legislation is limited in time. The Secretariat there-
fore cannot characterize the application of a new legal regime as a failure to en-
force an old one.... For the foregoing reasons, the Secretariat will not request a
response from the government of the United States of America.'" '
Earthlaw and the other submitters were upset with the result, and
identified a potential loophole flowing from the opinion's reasoning. The
"legislative exception" that the NGOs criticized was gleaned from the
10018, 10025 n.51 (Jan. 1996).
156. Hogue, supra note 68, at D-15.
157. Id.
158. Tutchton, supra note 155, at 10025 n.51.
159. Id. (quoting NAFTA Environmental Side Accord, supra note 8, at 1483).
160. Id.
161. Commission on Environmental Cooperation Opinion Letter on Petition Re-
garding Application of NAFTA Side Accord to Suspension of ESA Listings under FY
95 DOD Supplemental Funding Dated Sept. 25 (Text), 1995 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 187, at D-33 (Sept. 27, 1995). Victor Lichtinger, the Secretariat's Executive Direc-
tor, wrote the letter. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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following statements contained in the Secretariat's opinion letter dispos-
ing of the case:
However, Articles 14 and 15 read in conjunction with other provisions of the
Agreement strongly suggest that a failure to enforce environmental law applies to
the administrative agencies or officials charged with implementing laws and regu-
lations .... Articles 14 and 15 primarily envisage administrative breakdowns (fail-
ures) resulting from acts or omissions of an agency or official charged with imple-
menting environmental laws.... Articles 14 and 15 were intended to address
failures by enforcement agencies or departments, and not inaction mandated by
law. "A
Led by Earthlaw, the NGOs responded angrily by accusing the Secre-
tariat of exempting the legislature from having to enforce environmental
laws." The NGOs opined that "this blanket 'legislative exception' will
no doubt swallow the effective enforcement 'rule'. ... By distinguishing
legislative failures to effectively enforce environmental laws from execu-
tive or administrative failures, the Secretariat has created a distinction
without a difference.""
B. The National Forest Logging Case
On August 30, 1995, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund filed the sec-
ond petition with the Secretariat under the procedures of Articles 14 and
15, representing the interests of twenty environmental groups."7 The
complaint alleged that a rider attached to the 1995 fiscal year rescissions
package, which increased the amount of logging allowed in U.S. forests,
constituted a breach of U.S. environmental laws by preventing enforce-
ment of the laws." This petition sought to differentiate its argument
from the prior ESA Moratorium case by pointing out that, unlike the ESA
rider, "the logging rider [left] existing environmental laws intact but spe-
cifically preclude[d] their enforcement." "
The NGOs in this case, from the United States, Mexico, and Canada,
asserted that the suspension of enforcement was to allow for "salvage
logging of sick or diseased trees in old growth forests," but that the term
"salvage logging" was defined so broadly it "could be interpreted to mean
any tree that could someday be diseased."7 ° The rider's sponsor, Sena-
164. Id.
165. Tutchton, supra note 155, at 10025 n.51.
166. Id.
167. Hogue, supra note 68, at D-15.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Susan Bruninga, NAFTA: Environmentalists Seek Investigation of Logging Rid-
tor Gorton (R-Wash.), claimed to have drafted the rider to comply with
trade agreements and U.S. environmental laws. 7 ' However, the NGOs
and the attorneys filing on their behalf strongly disagreed. Patti Goldman,
the Sierra Club lawyer filing the petition, said that it was "outrageous for
a nation built on principles of freedom to suspend enforcement of its
laws and prevent citizens from holding the government accountable."'"
Bill Arthus, another Sierra Club attorney, said, "This is exactly what
the NAFTA environmental agreements is supposed to prevent .... Many
Americans feared that Mexico might lead a race to the bottom by lower-
ing environmental standards to help its industries."'7 3 He further added
that "[iut is ironic that the U.S. has been the first North American nation
to try to suspend its environmental standards, in this case to help the
timber industry."'
Nonetheless, the Secretariat found the submission unconvincing, and.
dismissed the submission without requesting a response from the United:
States.'75 In its December 8, 1995, opinion letter, by the same author as
the ESA Moratorium letter, the Secretariat relied on a time-worn rule of
statutory and treaty interpretation.'76 It determined that "'[t]he submis--
sion focuses on a later-enacted law that impacts on the implementation
of an existing environmental law without directly amending or repealing
it.... Where the new law explicitly exempts, modifies or waives provi.-
sions of an earlier law, the later-enacted law will prevail.""77
Consequently, once again, "[a] new legal regime [was not found to]
constitute a failure to enforce an old one."'78 It is unclear whether the
Secretariat must defer to prior decisions under a system of stare decisis,
but it appears to have happened in the first two submissions. Clearly, to
er Under Trade Agreement, 1995 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 169, at D-3 (Aug. 31,
1995).
171. Id. Senator Gorton included a "sufficiency provision" in the rider to ensure
that it complied with all applicable environmental and trade laws. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. "According to the petition, the logging rider leaves the actual laws in place;
it just suspends their enforcement. The rider directs the Departments of Agriculture
and Interior to increase the volume of salvage timber sales 'to the maximum extent
feasible.'" Id. To increase the volume, all that the rider requires is for the govern-
ment to receive one document containing an "environmental assessment under the
National Environmental Policy Act, and a biological review under the Endangered
Species Act." Id.
175. Cheryl Hogue, NAFTA: Logging Rider Does not Constitute Failure to Enforce
Laws, Commission Rules, 1995 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 238, at D-3 (Dec. 12,
1995).
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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succeed in triggering a response from a Party, a future submission must
be based not on a legislative enactment, but rather an administrative
oversight or negligent act. Congress and the President acting jointly will
thus not fail to enforce an environmental law."
C. The Cozumel Pier Case
The most recent case was filed against Mexico's government on Janu-
ary 18, 1996, by several Mexican ecology organizations." The petition
alleged that Mexico violated its environmental laws by allowing a Mexi-
can company, Consorcio H, to construct a port terminal on Cozumel
inside a coral reserve area without requiring an environmental impact
study. 8 ' Though a study was conducted in 1990, it only analyzed the
impact of pier construction, not of port operation." Referring to the
failure of the two prior petitions against the United States, the NGOs
argued this petition was suitable for investigation because it concerned
only current environmental laws and regulations, and there was no legis-
lative argument dealing with amendments or modifications."8
On February 12, 1996, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation
announced that "it would investigate alleged irregularities by Mexican
federal government authorities in the authorization process for an island
pier," and the Secretariat requested a response from the Mexican govern-
ment within thirty days." Another thirty days could be granted, howev-
179. Ann Devroy, President Calls for End to Logging of Old-Growth Trees, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 25, 1996, at A3. Interestingly, despite the defeat of the environmentalists'
petition, President Clinton recently called for a repeal of the logging rider. Id. White
House spokesman Mike McCurry said, "We believe there should be a repeal of cut-
ting in ancient, old-growth forests." Id. He added that the administration would ask
Congress "either for replacement timber allocations for companies that have valid
contracts or for buyout authority to stop the cutting." Id.
180. Dora Delgado, NAFTA: Groups File Petition to NAFTA Commission Stating
Port Project Violates Mexican Law, 1996 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at D-15
(Jan. 19, 1996).
181. Id. Note that unlike the environmental assessments and impact studies required
under U.S. law for federal government action, the environmental laws of most other
countries, including Mexico, require these studies for both public and private con-
struction, and this is the crux of the Cozumel pier case. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. NAITA: CEC to Investigate Authorization of Pier in Mexican Natural Protect-
ed Area, 1996 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at D-9 (Feb. 16, 1996).
er, if "required by exceptional circumstances. " " Significantly, though
the outcome is still indeterminate, this is the first petition to make it
over the Article 14(2) hurdle."w Following Mexico's response, the Secre-
tariat must decide whether or not to forward the submission to the
Council for approval to begin a fact-finding investigation.'87
The NGOs are hopeful. The remedy they seek is to prevent commence-
ment of the pier's operation for as long as possible because full opera-
tion would devastate the coral reef close to Cozumel's El Paraiso Beach,
whereas construction has affected only about 2.6% of the reef."w Seiz-
ing the opportunity to point out the government's politico-economic pref-
erences regarding law enforcement, the NGOs held a press conference
and stated, "[T]he Cozumel case is representative of the Mexican
government's common disregard of environmental regulations to privi-
leged domestic and foreign investment.""9
V. CONCLUSION
Although the NAFTA Environmental Side Accord is a jumble of proce-
dural hurdles and political trap doors, it represents significant progress
in the conflict-plagued, yet ever-improving, relationship between inter-
national free trade and environmental protection. Its successful negotia-
tion is a testament to the ability of nations to unite in an effort to resolve
the recurring and competing tensions between increased free trade and
greater environmental protection. The agreement is riddled with textual
weaknesses and hortatory enforcement provisions. Yet, for all this, it
constitutes a step in the right direction.
International trade regimes have been institutionalized and have grown
strong over the past century. Conversely, international environmental law
reflects only a patchwork of treaties and customs between states.'9 It
is a relatively new field of law, and there are no global institutions, like
the World Trade Organization, to present guidance for the enforcement
of the policies embodied in the Side Accord.' Until such a body comes
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues
and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. LJ. 675, 707-08 (1993)
("[I]nternational environmental law still consists only of many separate and disparate
legal instruments.").
191. Not surprisingly, several people have proposed the creation of an international
environmental institution, including Sir Geoffrey Palmer, former Prime Minister of
New Zealand:
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into existence, the successful marriage of international trade and envi-
ronmental policies will remain dependent on the work of sovereign
states settling disputes caused by these conflicting goals. The NAFTA
Environmental Side Accord can serve as a model for future trade agree-
ments only in a general sense. If future agreements copy its limited sub-
stantive achievements and procedural loopholes wholesale, then little
progress has been made. If future agreements use the Side Accord as a
framework for the creation of a new documentary synthesis between
free trade and environmental protection, however, then success has been
achieved, and the NAFTA Environmental Side Accord has served a larger
purpose as a developmental step in that direction.
We would envisage the new Environmental Protection Council becoming the
point in the United Nations system which links the streams of economic and
environmental advice. It would perform the function that currently falls be-
tween the cracks in the mandates of all existing organizations. It would have
responsibility for taking coordinated decisions on sustainable policies for
global environmental protection. It would be empowered to take binding deci-
sions .... But the key thing is that it should have power to act-not just
talk.
Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 259, 279 (1992).

